## ONLINE APPENDIX: Table I

## Regressions Explaining Relative Rank for Stock-Financed Deals Using All_GrProReturn and (All_GrPro)(TaxD)

This table reports sample-selection corrected OLS regressions explaining the bargaining split between target and acquirer acquirer shareholders in stock-financed deals. The sample consists of 1,881 mergers announced during 1981-2006 for which both the acquirer and target are listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, are not in the financial services industry, are not regulated utilities and for which stock comprises at least $50 \%$ of the consideration. A Heckman two-stage regression is estimated in which the first stage is a probit regression on the payment method (stock vs. cash) and the second stage is an OLS regression corrected for sample-selection (i.e. payment method choice). The dependent variable in the first-stage probit specification takes the value one if the deal consideration (proposed or completed) comprises more than $50 \%$ stock. The specification of the probit is the same as model (4) in this Table with the additional variable $A c q$ Cashflow/Tgt_Size defined as the acquirer's cash flow (EBIDT minus interest expense minus taxes minus preferred and common dividends) divided by the market value of the target's common equity. The output from the first stage of the two-stage regression is reported in the first column of results. The dependent variable in the second stage regression is Relative Rank, the ratio of the percentile rank of the target firm CAR to the percentile rank of the target firm CAR plus the percentile rank of the acquirer firm CAR. $C A R$ is the cumulative abnormal return over days -63 to +126 around the merger announcement using a marke model estimated with the CRSP value-weighted market return over days -318 to -64. Institutional ownership is measured at the latest quarter-end prior to the merger announcement using the CDA/Spectrum 13F database, and institutional style preference (growth vs. value) is according to Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy (2003). All GrPro is the aggregate ownership by all growth-oriented institutions of the target divided by the aggregate ownership of all institutional owners of the target. All_Agg is the total institutional ownership in the target. All_GrProReturn is the average holding period return of all growth-oriented institutions invested in the target in the quarter before the merger announcement interacted with the proportion of the target held by growth-oriented institutions. Tax $\Delta$ is the change in the capital gains tax rate from the baseline of $20 \%$. Target Return is the target firm's return over the year prior to the merger announcement. Transient_Agg is ownership by transient investors (those with relatively short holding periods) as classified in Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000). Log(Acquirer Scaled Size) is the market value of the acquirer's common equity divided by the size of the equity market used in the CRSP valueweighted market index. Log(Relative Acquirer Size) is the $\log$ of the market value of the acquirer's equity divided by that of the target. Acquirer Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Non-diversifying is an indicator set to one if the acquirer and target share the same three-digit SIC code. Toehold_Dum is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bidder holds the target's stock as of the announcement date. Combined Value is the weighted average (using the prior fiscal year's total assets as weights) of the target and acquirer CARs over days -63 to +126 around the merger announcement using a market model estimated with the CRSP value-weighted market return over days -318 to -64. Statistical significance of Heckman's Lambda implies that sample selection is relevant. Year and industry dummies are included (but not reported) and heteroskedasticity-adjusted p-values are in parentheses beneath coefficients.

|  | $1^{\text {st }}$ Stage | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All_GrPro | 0.9916*** | -0.1890*** | -0.1923*** | -0.1548*** | -0.1590*** | -0.2187*** | -0.2218*** | -0.1751*** | -0.1791*** |
|  | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [0.004] | [0.005] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [0.002] | [0.004] |
| All_GrProReturn | 0.0622 |  | -0.0032* |  | -0.0029* |  | -0.0097* |  | -0.0087* |
|  | [0.501] |  | [0.083] |  | [0.085] |  | [0.059] |  | [0.062] |
| (All_GrPro)(Tax $\Delta$ ) | -0.0706 |  |  | -1.6066* | -1.6210* |  |  | -1.9019* | -1.8739* |
|  | [0.989] |  |  | [0.098] | [0.099] |  |  | [0.092] | [0.095] |
| Tax $\Delta$ | 9.3730** |  |  | 0.3624 | 0.3070 |  |  | 0.3667 | 0.2369 |
|  | [0.028] |  |  | [0.714] | [0.760] |  |  | [0.739] | [0.840] |
| Target Return | -0.1164** |  | 0.0037 |  | 0.0041 |  | 0.0079 |  | 0.0074 |
|  | [0.050] |  | [0.723] |  | [0.697] |  | [0.507] |  | [0.524] |
| All_Agg | -0.7788*** | 0.1235** | 0.1289** | 0.1319** | 0.1382** | 0.1414** | 0.1519** | 0.1448*** | 0.1547** |
|  | [0.002] | [0.020] | [0.021] | [0.014] | [0.014] | [0.012] | [0.015] | [0.010] | [0.011] |
| Transient_Agg | 1.1291** | -0.3374*** | -0.3437*** | -0.3450*** | -0.3531*** | -0.3413*** | $-0.3482 * * *$ | -0.3415*** | -0.3483*** |
|  | [0.023] | [ $<0.001$ ] | [0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [0.001] | [0.002] | [0.001] | [0.001] |
| Log(Acq P/B) | 0.3208*** | 0.0077 | 0.0060 | 0.0064 | 0.0044 | -0.0090 | -0.0122 | -0.0087 | -0.0119 |
|  | [<0.001] | [0.552] | [0.668] | [0.623] | [0.759] | [0.554] | [0.481] | [0.560] | [0.481] |
| Log(Acq Scaled Size) | 0.1149*** | -0.0148** | -0.0153** | -0.0153** | -0.0161** | -0.0215** | $-0.0227^{* *}$ | -0.0213** | -0.0224** |
|  | [0.001] | [0.038] | [0.044] | [0.033] | [0.037] | [0.010] | [0.017] | [0.011] | [0.016] |


| Log(Acq Rel. Size) | -0.3215*** | 0.0452*** | $0.0467^{* * *}$ | 0.0463*** | 0.0483*** | $0.0596 * * *$ | 0.0631*** | 0.0586** | 0.0620* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [0.001] | [<0.001] | [0.001] | [<0.001] | [0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] |
| Acq Leverage | -1.0354*** | -0.0594 | -0.0555 | -0.0526 | -0.0479 | -0.0003 | 0.0075 | 0.0015 | 0.0090 |
|  | [<0.001] | [0.253] | [0.303] | [0.316] | [0.380] | [0.996] | [0.908] | [0.980] | [0.888] |
| Non-Diversifying | 0.0508 | -0.0301** | -0.0311** | -0.0312** | -0.0323** | -0.0296* | -0.0317* | -0.0311* | -0.0330* |
|  | [0.523] | [0.048] | [0.046] | [0.042] | [0.040] | [0.079] | [0.083] | [0.063] | [0.064] |
| Toehold_Dum | -0.9070*** | 0.1126** | 0.1181** | 0.1182** | 0.1248** | 0.1335** | 0.1426** | 0.1326** | 0.1414** |
|  | [<0.001] | [0.032] | [0.031] | [0.025] | [0.024] | [0.026] | [0.030] | [0.026] | [0.027] |
| Combined Value | -0.0849 | -0.0609*** | -0.0607*** | -0.0602*** | -0.0599*** | -0.0830*** | -0.0835*** | -0.0822*** | -0.0826*** |
|  | [0.363] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] |
| Acq Cashflow/Tgt_Size | -0.0147** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | [0.045] |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.9102 | 0.5578*** | 0.5612*** | 0.5409*** | 0.5442*** | 0.5318*** | 0.5363*** | 0.5092*** | 0.5136*** |
|  | [0.124] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] |
| Heckman's Lambda |  | -0.1642*** | -0.1742** | -0.1712*** | -0.1831*** | -0.2169*** | -0.2362*** | -0.2116*** | -0.2300*** |
|  |  | [0.009] | [0.011] | [0.007] | [0.008] | [0.001] | [0.002] | [0.001] | [0.002] |
| Observations | 1,881 | 830 | 830 | 830 | 830 | 712 | 712 | 712 | 712 |

## ONLINE APPENDIX: Table II

## Probit Regressions Explaining Method of Payment Choice All_GrProReturn and (All_GrPro)(Tax $\Delta$ )

This table reports probit regressions explaining the choice between stock and cash mergers accounting for the difference in anticipated premiums. The sample consists of 1,881 mergers announced during 1981-2006 for which both the acquirer and target are listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, are not in the financial services industry, and are not regulated utilities. The probit regression binary dependent variable takes the value one if the deal consideration (proposed or completed) comprises more than $50 \%$ stock. Predicted Prem (Cash-Stock) is the difference in predicted premiums. The predicted premium for stock deals is the fitted value from model $2,3,6$ or 7 in Table III depending on sample (all versus completed) and tax variable, All_GrProReturn or (AllGrPro) $x$ (Tax $\Delta$ ) as noted in each specification below. The predicted premium for cash deals is estimated from similar models but on the basis of cash deals. All_GrProReturn is the average holding period return of all growth-oriented institutions invested in the target in the quarter before the merger announcement interacted with the proportion of the target held by growth-oriented institutions. Tax $\Delta$ is the change in the capital gains tax rate from the baseline of $20 \%$. Target Return is the target firm's return over the year prior to the merger announcement. All Agg is the total institutional ownership in the target. Institutional ownership is measured at the latest quarter-end prior to the merger announcement using the CDA/Spectrum 13F database. For the remaining variables, market values are measured 20 days prior to the merger announcement and accounting items are measured at the latest fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement. $\log (A c q u i r e r ~ P / B)$ is the log of the acquirer's price-to-book ratio of equity. $\log ($ Acquirer Scaled Size) is the market value of the acquirer's common equity divided by the size of the equity market used in the CRSP value-weighted market index. $\log$ (Relative Acquirer Size) is the log of the market value of the acquirer's equity divided by that of the target. Acquirer Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Non-diversifying is an indicator set to one if the acquirer and target share the same three-digit SIC code. Toehold_Dum is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the bidder holds the target's stock as of the announcement date. Year and industry dummies are included (but not reported) and heteroskedasticity-adjusted pvalues are in parentheses beneath coefficients, which are marginal effects.

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sample: | All | All | All | All | Completed | Completed | Completed | Completed |
| Tax Variable Used in Predicted | All_GrProReturn | All_GrProReturn | (All_GrPro) | (All_GrPro) | All_GrProReturn | All_GrProReturn | (All_GrPro) | (All_GrPro) |
| Premium Regression |  |  | $\mathrm{x}(\operatorname{Tax} \Delta)$ | $\mathrm{x}(\operatorname{Tax} \Delta)$ |  |  | $\mathrm{x}(\operatorname{Tax} \Delta)$ | $\mathrm{x}(\operatorname{Tax} \Delta)$ |
| Predicted Premium (Cash-Stock) | 0.5503*** | 0.4245*** | 0.7080*** | 0.6455*** | 0.5538*** | 0.3752*** | 0.7329*** | 0.6020*** |
|  | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] |
| All_Agg |  | -0.0342 |  | 0.0031 |  | -0.0550 |  | -0.0126 |
|  |  | [0.649] |  | [0.966] |  | [0.501] |  | [0.875] |
| $\log (\mathrm{Acq} \mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B})$ |  | 0.1022*** |  | 0.0574*** |  | 0.1178*** |  | 0.0709*** |
|  |  | [<0.001] |  | [0.004] |  | [<0.001] |  | [0.002] |
| Log(Acq Scaled Size) |  | 0.0282** |  | 0.0108 |  | 0.0394*** |  | 0.0219 |
|  |  | [0.035] |  | [0.412] |  | [0.008] |  | [0.135] |
| Log(Acq Rel. Size) |  | $-0.0659 * * *$ |  | -0.0217 |  | $-0.0987 * * *$ |  | -0.0524*** |
|  |  | [<0.001] |  | [0.203] |  | [<0.001] |  | [0.006] |
| Acq Leverage |  | $-0.3651 * * *$ |  | -0.2996*** |  | -0.3692*** |  | -0.3024*** |
|  |  | [<0.001] |  | [<0.001] |  | [<0.001] |  | [0.001] |
| Non-Diversifying |  | -0.0204 |  | -0.0604** |  | -0.0116 |  | -0.0534* |
|  |  | [0.489] |  | [0.034] |  | [0.717] |  | [0.089] |
| Toehold_Dum |  | -0.2522*** |  | -0.1911*** |  | -0.2070*** |  | -0.1447* |
|  |  | [<0.001] |  | [0.002] |  | [0.009] |  | [0.067] |
| Observations | 1,881 | 1,881 | 1,881 | 1,881 | 1,545 | 1,545 | 1,545 | 1,545 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.220 | 0.251 | 0.253 | 0.267 | 0.221 | 0.258 | 0.260 | 0.274 |

## ONLINE APPENDIX: Table III

## Institutional Monitoring, Acquirer Valuation, and Capital Gains using All_GrProReturn and (AllGr_Pro)(Tax $\Delta$ )

This table reports sample-selection corrected OLS regressions explaining the premium in stock-financed deals. The sample consists of 1,881 mergers announced during 1981-2006 for which both the acquirer and target are listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, are not in the financial services industry, are not regulated utilities, and for which stock comprises at least $50 \%$ of the consideration. Panel $A$ investigates the role of institutional monitoring of the target by examining the extent to which institutions are relatively short-term or long-term investors. Transient_Agg is ownership by transient investors (those with relatively short holding periods) as classified in Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000). Dedicated_Agg is ownership by dedicated investors (those with relatively long holding periods) as classified in Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000). Panel $B$ investigates the role acquirer valuation. $\log (A c q u i r e r ~ P / B)$ is the log of the acquirer's price-to-book ratio of equity. Acquirer Return is the acquirer firm's return over the year prior to the merger announcement. In both panels a Heckman two-stage regression is estimated in which the first stage is a probit regression on the payment method (stock vs. cash) and the second stage is an OLS regression corrected for sample-selection (i.e. payment method choice). The dependent variable in the first-stage probit specification takes the value one if the deal consideration (proposed or completed) comprises more than $50 \%$ stock. The specification of the probit is the same as the corresponding model in this Table with the additional variable Acq Cashflow/Tgt_Size defined as the acquirer's cash flow (EBIDT minus interest expense minus taxes minus preferred and common dividends) divided by the market value of the target's common equity. The dependent variable in the second-stage OLS regressions below is Premium, the cumulative abnormal return over days -63 to +126 around the merger announcement using a market model estimated with the CRSP value-weighted market return over days -318 to -64. Institutional ownership is measured at the latest quarter-end prior to the merger announcement using the CDA/Spectrum 13F database, and institutional style preference (growth vs. value) is according to Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy (2003). All_GrPro is the aggregate ownership by all growth-oriented institutions of the target divided by the aggregate ownership of all institutional owners of the target. All_GrProReturn is the average holding period return of all growth-oriented institutions invested in the target in the quarter before the merger announcement interacted with the proportion of the target held by growth-oriented institutions. Tax $\Delta$ is the change in the capital gains tax rate from the baseline of $20 \%$. The regressions in Panel $A$ also include control variables Target Return, All_Agg, Acq CAR(-1,+1), Log(Acquirer P/B), Log(Acquirer Scaled Size), Log(Relative Acquirer Size), Acquirer Leverage, NonDiversifying, Toehold_Dum, year and industry dummies which we do not report below for brevity. The regressions in Panel B also include control variables Target Return, All_Agg, Transient_Agg, Acq CAR(-1,+1), Log(Acquirer Scaled Size), Log(Relative Acquirer Size), Acquirer Leverage, Non-Diversifying, Toehold_Dum, year and industry dummies which we do not report below for brevity. See Table IV for all control variable definitions. The statistical significance of Heckman's Lambda implies that sample selection is relevant. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted p-values are in parentheses beneath coefficients.

| Panel A: Transient \& Dedicated Investors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Deals | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | All | All | All | All | Completed | Completed | Completed | Completed |
| All_GrPro | -0.5061*** | -0.4443*** | -0.5845*** | -0.5243*** | -0.5180*** | -0.4557*** | -0.5690*** | -0.5015*** |
|  | [0.001] | [0.002] | [<0.001] | [<0.001] | [0.001] | [0.002] | [<0.001] | [0.001] |
| All_GrProReturn | -0.1214*** | -0.1117** | -0.1135** | -0.1095** | -0.1349*** | -0.1246*** | -0.1292*** | -0.1237*** |
|  | [0.005] | [0.010] | [0.010] | [0.013] | [0.003] | [0.005] | [0.005] | [0.006] |
| (All_GrPro)(Tax $\Delta$ ) | -3.4522 | -3.7742 | -4.0408 | -4.0687 | -3.8351 | -3.9680 | -4.3239 | -4.2263 |
|  | [0.241] | [0.199] | [0.174] | [0.169] | [0.224] | [0.203] | [0.173] | [0.178] |
| Transient_Agg |  | -0.9966*** |  | -0.6302** |  | -0.9023*** |  | -0.6756** |
|  |  | [<0.001] |  | [0.036] |  | [0.001] |  | [0.030] |
| Dedicated_Agg |  |  | 1.2006*** | 0.8992*** |  |  | 0.8492*** | 0.5156 |
|  |  |  | [<0.001] | [0.004] |  |  | [0.004] | [0.110] |
| Tax $\Delta$ | 0.2326 | 1.1446 | -1.9854 | -0.8102 | 0.4869 | 1.2325 | -1.0055 | 0.1648 |
|  | [0.933] | [0.678] | [0.492] | [0.778] | [0.872] | [0.678] | [0.746] | [0.957] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Heckman's Lambda | $-0.4566 * * *$ | -0.4698*** | $-0.5119^{* * *}$ | $-0.5025^{* * *}$ | -0.5178*** | -0.4997*** | $-0.5403 * * *$ | $-0.5154^{* * *}$ |
|  | [0.004] | [0.003] | [0.001] | [0.001] | [0.002] | [0.002] | [0.001] | [0.001] |
| Observations | 830 | 830 | 830 | 830 | 712 | 712 | 712 | 712 |


| Panel B: Acquirer Valuation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Deals | All | All | All | All | Completed | Completed | Completed | Completed |
| All_GrPro | -0.4907*** | -0.4443*** | -0.4682*** | -0.4670*** | -0.4903*** | -0.4557*** | -0.4767*** | -0.4893*** |
|  | [0.001] | [0.002] | [0.001] | [0.001] | [0.002] | [0.002] | [0.001] | [0.001] |
| All_GrProReturn | -0.1289*** | -0.1117** | -0.1117*** | -0.1008** | -0.1373*** | -0.1246*** | -0.1255*** | -0.1166*** |
|  | [0.004] | [0.010] | [0.009] | [0.020] | [0.002] | [0.005] | [0.003] | [0.008] |
| $($ All_GrPro)(Tax $\Delta$ ) | -3.6032 | -3.7742 | -3.3383 | -3.5026 | -3.5813 | -3.9680 | -3.1735 | -3.4327 |
|  | [0.226] | [0.199] | [0.249] | [0.230] | [0.250] | [0.203] | [0.292] | [0.266] |
| $\log ($ Acq P/B) |  | -0.1070*** |  | -0.1155*** |  | -0.1026*** |  | -0.1128*** |
|  |  | [0.001] |  | [<0.001] |  | [0.006] |  | [0.001] |
| Acquirer Return |  |  | -0.0190 | 0.0073 |  |  | -0.0118 | 0.0020 |
|  |  |  | [0.460] | [0.773] |  |  | [0.662] | [0.941] |
| Tax $\Delta$ | 0.7820 | 1.1446 | 1.1712 | 1.0216 | 1.1105 | 1.2325 | 1.7129 | 1.1075 |
|  | [0.781] | [0.678] | [0.665] | [0.707] | [0.716] | [0.678] | [0.544] | [0.700] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Heckman's Lambda | $-0.5032 * * *$ | -0.4698*** | $-0.4308^{* * *}$ | -0.4740*** | -0.4784*** | -0.4997*** | -0.3795*** | $-0.4903 * * *$ |
|  | [0.004] | [0.003] | [0.005] | [0.001] | [0.008] | [0.002] | [0.009] | [0.001] |
| Observations | 830 | 830 | 830 | 830 | 712 | 712 | 712 | 712 |

